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THE DISCRIMINATION AND DENIAL OF
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS FOR THE PEOPLE OF SINDH
Kavita Tekchandani1
I.

The Creation of Pakistan
Pakistan was created out of the Indian partition of 1947, following

two centuries of British colonial rule. Its creation was the consequence of
an inability to accommodate minority interests within independent India.2
The Muslim minority within India feared they would become second-class
citizens in a Hindu-majority state. The Muslim League, therefore, pushed
to form an independent Muslim state. The partition, the arbitrary drawing
of borders, resulted in eight million people, mainly Muslims migrating
from India to Pakistan and millions of Sikhs and Hindus migrating from
Pakistan to India making it the largest inter-state migration in history and,
in the process, creating millions of refugees.3
Prior to Indian Independence, and on the basis of their shared faith,
the Muslim population, who would later create Pakistan, felt that they
were a unified community, despite their many ethnic and linguistic
differences. They conceived themselves as intrinsically different from the
other religious and cultural groups on the Indian sub-continent.4 However,
following the creation of Pakistan, the Muslim population no longer feared
being discriminated against by a Hindu majority state that in turn, failed to
1

Kavita Tekchandani is a recent graduate of UC Hastings School of Law where she
focused on international law. Ms. Tekchandani is currently interning at the India Centre
for Human Rights and the Law in Mumbai. She wrote this paper to help bring to the
attention of the international community the denial of cultural and human rights and
environmental atrocities being faced by Sindhis in Pakistan, with the hope that a peaceful
and lasting solution to the conflict is soon reached.
2
JAVAID REHMAN, THE WEAKNESSES IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF MINORITY
RIGHTS 5 (Kluwer Law Int. 2000).
3
Id.
4
Id. at 133.
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unify the Muslim population. Though Pakistan was a state created on
religious lines, a significant number of religious, ethnic and linguistic
minorities were part of the composition of the country.5
In the creation of Pakistan, various regional minorities charged that
they had been discriminated against and forced to assimilate into the
central government’s notion of what constituted the national Pakistani
identity.6 Within Pakistan there exists five major regional provinces;
Sindh, Punjab, Baluchistan, Azad Kashmir and the North West Frontier
Province (NWFP).
II.

Sindh: A Nation of its Own
Sindh is Pakistan’s second largest province with approximately

24% of the nation’s population.7 Sindhi is a term used to describe the
indigenous people of Sindh, the southeast province of Pakistan. Sindhis
have one of the oldest cultures and civilizations in the world. The
Mohenjo-Daro civilization, dating back approximately 5,000 years, was
one of the first civilizations of the world and was formed along the banks
of the Indus River running through the heart of what is now known as the
Sindh province. This region has historically enjoyed a great deal of
autonomy, allowing for the development of its own culture. Sindhis have
historically been known to promote a culture of non-violence, secularism
and democracy.
During the time of the partition, there was an effort to drive out the
Sindhi Hindus into India. The property left behind by the Hindus was
arbitrarily distributed to political supporters of the then ruling government
5

Id.
Id. Pakistan actively campaigned to bring assimilation and conformity to the population,
in an effort to build nationalism. See Id at 141.
7
Amnesty International Special Report: Pakistan, Arrests of Political Opponents in Sindh
Province, August 1990- early 1992, 3 (1992), available at
http://www.amnestyusa.org/countries/pakistan/document.do?id=3A9E2BD6FD58394D8
02569A600601F5B.
6
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and Muslim refugees coming from the newly independent India, by the
National Government. The influx of the Muslim refugees coming from
India, known as the Muhajirs, resulted in Sindhis becoming a minority in
their own land.8 The sudden Muhajir influx and the national government’s
policy of cultural assimilation has been the root causes in bringing the
Sindhi culture and language to the brink of extinction. The case of the
Sindhis reflects the reality that international and national laws against
discrimination and genocide offer ineffective protections for minorities,
unless governments take steps to also protect these minorities from mass
deportation and imposition of an alien population onto their land.9
III.

Sindhis: Constituting an Ethnic and Linguistic Minority
“Pakistan is not a monolithic, homogeneous entity but a homeland

of five historic nations.”10 In the first years following independence,
Pakistan demonstrated a strong commitment to adopt principles of
equality and non-discrimination for all individuals. Pakistan ratified
various international covenants and instruments affirming its commitment
to protect minorities. These commitments include: the United Nations
Charter, the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities and the United Nations
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (implemented through the Committee on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination (CERD).11 Pakistan’s Constitutions of 1956,

8

REHMAN, supra note 1, at 87.
Id.
10
The Sindh Perchar, Official Newsletter of the World Sindhi Congress, Delegates at the
International Conference on Sindh (Sep. 30, 2003), available at
http://www.sindhlink.net/wsc/2003/Press_Release_AGM2003.doc.
11
REHMAN, supra note 1, at 135. See also NATAN LERNER, GROUP RIGHTS AND
DISCRIMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 46 (Kluwer Academic Publishers 1991).
9
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1963 and 1973 have all affirmed fundamental rights based on equality and
non-discrimination.12
However,

despite

such

international

and

constitutional

commitments, the Government of Pakistan has not actually put these
obligations into practice. The official stance of the Government is that no
ethnic, racial and linguistic minorities exist within Pakistan.13 The only
minorities recognized by the Government are religious minorities.14
The Pakistani- Islamabad based government realizes that giving an
official recognition to such minorities would give these minorities a basis
on which to claim protection under the international legal instruments
Pakistan signed in its formative years.15 The result is that linguistic and
ethnic minorities like the Sindhis, Baluchis, Muhajirs and Pakhtuns are not
given any official minority status and, therefore, no protections.16
This same policy of refusing to recognize ethnic and linguistic
minorities was a driving force behind the secession movement of the East
Pakistanis to form an independent Bangladesh in 1971.17 It has been
argued that if Pakistan accorded more linguistic and cultural autonomy to
East Pakistan, the people would not have demanded an independent state
and would have rather been able to express their self-determination within
the structures and confines of the Pakistani nation-state.18
State reports submitted to CERD, which is the implementing
mechanism of the Convention of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
deny that Pakistan has any ethnic or linguistic minorities.19 During the 4th

12

REHMAN, supra note 1, at 135.
Id. at 136. See also The Sindh Perchar, supra note 10, at 2.
14
REHMAN, supra note 1, at 136.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 136.
17
Id. at 219
18
Id. at 219 [Argument by Author, Javaid Rehman].
19
Id.
13
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Periodic Report to the Committee, the Pakistan representative explained
that they did not provide the Committee with information of its people
based on race, descent or ethnic origin, because their government did not
keep data on such characteristics of its people because “[i]n Pakistan there
[are] no racial or ethnic minorities, but only religious minorities…”20 In
the 5th Report, despite criticisms from the Committee, there were further
denials of the existence of such minorities. The Pakistani representative
stated:
The people of Pakistan being of a relatively homogenic
racial group and following the precepts of Islam, which is a
universal religion advocating tolerance for people
belonging to every race, have not faced the problem of
discrimination. It has therefore not been necessary to enact
any new laws… to deal specifically with racial
discrimination other than already existing in the country.21
Committee members rightly expressed their concerns that if all
state parties to the Convention were to adopt the same criteria to decide if
it was necessary to adopt new measures to protect their racial minorities
against discrimination, then all signatories would all be exempt from their
obligations under the Convention.22 The Committee has also expressed
concern that Pakistan’s policy in refusing to recognize its minorities has
resulted in not giving them any specific protection under the Convention
that would otherwise derive from their official recognition.23
During the 15th International Conference of the World Sindhi
Congress, held in London, political scholar Dr. Walt Landry emphasized
20

REHMAN, supra note 1, at 137 (quoting 4th Periodic Report of Pakistan before the
Committee, CERD/C/SR.322 para. 3).
21
Id. at 138. (quoting the 5th Periodic Report of Pakistan before the Committee,
CERD/C/20/Add.15, para.1).
22
Id.
23
Id. See Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Observations and
Comments CERD/C/304/Add.25 para.12, available at
http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/(Symbol)/CERD.C.304.Add.25.En?Opendocument.
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that Pakistan, like the European federations, could not last or prosper
without giving recognition to the separate identities of the ethno lingual
groups within their borders.24 Pakistan’s policy in refusing to recognize
the existence of these differences was compared to the policy taken by the
former Yugoslavia, which resulted in polarity, violence and frustration
among the cultural groups.25
IV.

Sindh and the Muhajirs
Muhajirs is a term used to describe the Muslim population that

migrated from India to Pakistan and who came to settle in the Sindh
province. Following partition in 1947, millions of Sindhi Hindus and
Sikhs were forced to leave Sindh for India. They were replaced by
millions of Muhajirs, who came to dominate the local and national
political arena for many years.

26

Seats in the Sindh Provincial Assembly

were provided for the new arriving Muhajirs.27
In fact, the Muhajirs also began to dominate the civil service,
military positions and places of higher education. The Sindhis were
predominantly an agricultural society. The Muhajirs however, were
coming mainly from the cities and towns of India, representing a largely
urbanized, entrepreneurial and educated class.

28

There were constant

Muhajir-led federal interventions into the local government affairs of the
regional provinces.

29

The language, culture and politics brought by the

new refugees that began to dominate Pakistani society, was very different
than what Sindhis were used to. 30
24

The Sindh Perchar, supra note 9.
Id.
26
REHMAN, supra note 1, at 215. (For example, from 1947-1952 the majority of
Pakistan’s main political positions were held by Muhajirs).
27
Id.
28
Id. at 216.
29
Id. at 215.
30
REHMAN, supra note 1, at 215.
25
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Sindhis soon became only a bare majority in the seven main cities
of the province. The impact of being inundated by the Muhajirs was
enormous. First, Karachi, the biggest city and main port of Sindh, was
detached from the state and made into a “federal district.”31 Sindhi
language was then abolished within the Karachi federal offices and banned
from being used in Karachi university examinations, and the language
department of the University of Karachi was shut down.32 Urdu was then
made the national language, despite the fact that less than 8% of the
population of the entire country spoke the language.

33

This brought on a

deep division between the native Sindhis and the Muhajirs.
The first elected Prime Minister, Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1973-1977),
a native Sindhi, pushed for alleviating some Sindhi grievances of
discrimination.34 He introduced a lateral entry program for Sindhis to join
the civil service. Sindhis were allotted a quota of 11.4% of the seats in the
federal bureaucracy.35 Furthermore, more Sindhis were appointed to
national and provincial government offices. The Muhajirs, however,
interpreted these actions as going against Muhajir interests. The Muhajirs
then had basis to make claims of discrimination, persecution and political
repression. In fact, many Muhajir groups participated in the military coup
led by General Zia-ul-Haq to replace Bhutto.36
Today, Sindhis and the Muhajirs share some of the same concerns,
as they both face discrimination from the central government. They want
to ban the influx of more outsiders, such as those from the Punjab
province, and allowing properties within Sindh to be sold to the new
arrivals. They also demand greater provincial freedoms, and less
31

Id. at 216.
Id.
33
Id. at 141.
34
Id. at 217.
35
Id.
32
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interference from the central government.37 They are also united against
the building of the Kalabagh Dam and Greater Thal Canal on the River
Indus, which would result in great environmental and human costs in the
province.
V. Specific Repression of Political Opponents in the Sindh Province
1. Overview
For years, Sindhi political and human rights organizations reported
discrimination and political repression by the national government against
Sindhis who were calling for increased political, cultural and linguistic
autonomy. The 1992 Amnesty International Reports confirmed mass
political imprisonment of political opposition members in the Sindh
province from the 1990-1992 period.38
The dismissal of Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in August 1990,
resulted in hundreds of opposition political party members being arrested,
most of them associated with the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and other
Sindhi nationalist parties.39 The PPP is a national party, but has its largest
membership and organizational base in the Sindh.40 Amnesty International
has evidence that a large number of prisoners were political prisoners,
many who are “prisoners of conscious,” detained for the peaceful exercise
of rights such as freedom of association and freedom of expression.41
2. Political Developments in Sindh
In August 1990 the President of Pakistan, Ghulam Ishaq Khan,
dismissed Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto, daughter of former Prime

36

REHMAN, supra note 1, at 217.
Id. at 218.
38
Amnesty International Special Report, supra note 7, at 2.
39
Id.
40
Id. at 3.
41
Id.
37
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Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, under the PPP government.42 Khan went on
to dismiss all the national and provincial assemblies, calling a State of
Emergency.

Benazir Bhutto maintained that her dismissal was an

“unconstitutional coup” and illegal.43 However, a Lahore High Court
confirmed the dismissal as legal and constitutional, because, among other
things, the PPP government failed to pass substantive legislation and to
maintain law and order in Sindh.44 Prime Minister Bhutto was charged
with favoritism and corruption.45
However, International observers, including the UK Parliamentary
Human Rights Group concluded that that the hearings against Benazir
Bhutto were “misconceived and partisan” and were brought by the PPP’s
principle opponent for political reasons.46 The Human Rights Commission
of Pakistan observed that the “special tribunals against members of the
outgoing government were noisily launched during the run-up to elections
and the charges were repeatedly cited… to run down the party in the eyes
of the voter.”47
The State of Emergency was lifted when Prime Minister Nawaz
Sharif, backed by the Islamic Democratic Alliance (IDA), took office.
The IDA also won the general elections.48 The provincial government of
Sindh consisted of a coalition of the PPP and Muhajir Quami Movement

42

Id. at 5.
Id. at 6.
44
Amnesty International Special Report, supra note 7, at 6.
45
Id. at 7. The Fordham Institute for Ethics and Economic Policy (FIEEP) at Fordham
University, Corruption Information Exchange Report on Pakistan, available at
http://www.fordham.edu/economics/vinod/cie/pakistan.htm. However, in July 2003, both
Zardari and Benazir Bhutto were convicted of money laundering by a Geneva magistrate,
which allegedly took place during her 1993 to 1996 term as prime minister. They refused
to comply with the magistrate’s order to return US $11million to the Pakistan
government.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id.
43
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party (MQM), who took power in 1988.49 Following the dismissal of this
provincial government, a caretaker government under Jam Sadiq Ali was
installed in August 1990.50 Elections were not held until October 27, 1990,
where the IDA, and an alliance of nine right wing and Islamic parties,
together with the MQM formed the government.51
During this time there was also political unrest due to an ethnic
conflict between the Urdu speaking Muhajirs (MQM) and the indigenous
Sindhis.52 The Sindhi nationalist parties including, Jeay Sindh Mahaz (led
by GM Syed), Jeay Sindh Progressive Party, the Sindhi National Front and
the Sindhi Awami Tehrik, expressed a fear that the Sindhis would be
outnumbered and dominated by the Muhajirs.53 Ethnic strife was high
during PM Bhutto’s term in office. The MQM transferred its alliance from
the PPP to the IDA, when they felt they did not receive enough support
from PM Benazir Bhutto and the PPP.54 In 1990, the political strife
between the MQM and PPP hit a peak when the MQM organized a
general strike and hunger strike in January.55 In May of that year, security
forces raided a Muhajir community that resulted in massive rioting.
Several thousands were arrested and about one hundred people were
killed.56
Although the ethnic conflict decreased following the IDA
assumption of office in 1990, there was still a very high number of
political and criminal violence in the area.57 For example, in the first ten

49

Id.
Amnesty International Special Report, supra note 7, at 7.
51
Id.
52
Id. at 3.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Amnesty International Special Report, supra note 7, at 3.
57
Id. at 7.
50
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weeks of 1991, 738 kidnappings and 320 murders were reported.58 The
provincial government has held the PPP and allies to be responsible for
these politically motivated crimes, but the PPP denied these charges.59
Both the IDA led provincial government and the federal
government led by Prime Minister Sharif led a policy of intimidation of
the major opposition parties: the PPP and Sindhi Nationalist parties.60The
Sindh Chief Minister, Jam Sadiq Ali, in an effort to crush the PPP, tried to
portray the PPP as a terrorist organization.61 To do this, the provincial
government made public statements to identify the PPP with a notorious
terrorist organization, the Al-Zulfikar Organization (AZO).62 Chief
Minister Sadiq declared to the press in November 1991 that, “the PPP and
AZO are two names for one party.”63 The AZO was responsible for a
number of terrorist attacks within Pakistan in the early 1980’s, and is
believed to be founded by PM Benazir Bhutto’s brothers, Murtaza and
Shanawaz.64 Among other things, the AZO has been accused of making
various assassination attempts on General Zia ul-Haq’s life and hijacking a
Pakistani airplane en route to Kabul.65 The PPP, however, has consistently
denied any involvement with AZO activities.66 In fact, after years of
hiding in Syria, when Murtaza returned to Pakistan in 1988, he entered as
a political rival against his sister Benazir and formed a political faction of
PPP- known as Shaheed Bhutto.67
58

Id.
Id.
60
Id. at 4.
61
Id.
62
Amnesty International Special Report, supra note 7, at 4.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 5.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Syed Saleem Shazad, Saudi, Morocco Blasts may Fuel Kashmir Terror, South Asia
Monitor, available at http://www.southasiamonitor .org/focus/2003/may/23foc01.html
(last visited May 20, 2004).
59
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3. Patterns of Political Detention in Sindh
In an effort to crush the Sindh Nationalist Parties and the PPP, the
IDA backed government has used two main methods of political
intimidation. First, they have arrested opposition leaders using successive
detention orders, and arrests based on pretentious criminal charges, and
secondly, they have used mass arrests for the opposition supporters.68
Former members of the National Assembly (MNAs) and Members
of the Provincial Assembly (MPA’s), as well as other PPP leaders have
been arrested on what Amnesty International believes are un-sustained,
politically motivated charges.

69

Furthermore, PPP members have been

accused of being responsible for violent incidents in 1991, though there
was no prima facie evidence to even link them with the events.70 Mass
arrests of PPP members, Sindhi nationalist party members, and dissident
members of the MQM also occurred during demonstrations.71
Repeated arrests, without foundation, have been used to keep such
legislatures and opposition leaders from carrying out their political
obligations and non-violent political activities.72 Furthermore, another
form of political arrest has been short-term detentions of opposition party
candidates, to prevent them from participating in elections and
parliamentary votes.73 As an example of this phenomenon, is the case of
Pir-Mazhar-ul-Haq, a lawyer who was elected to the Sindh provincial
assembly by the PPP government in Sindh.74

68

Amnesty International Special Report, supra note 7, at 7-8.
Id. at 8.
70
Id.
71
Id.
72
Id at 9.
73
Id.
74
Amnesty International Special Report, supra note 7, at 9.
69
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Pir Mazhar was arrested on August 1990 on various un-related
criminal charges including kidnapping for ransom and robbery.75 He was
not given access to defense counsel or his family.76 The charges were
finally dropped in September, after no evidence against him was found.77
Despite the discharge order, he was not released; instead he was rearrested on three more unrelated criminal charges.78 For a week he was not
brought before the magistrate, and yet his custody was remanded.79 His
release was finally ordered in September, as the police were again not able
to produce any evidence against him.80
However, though the police report showed Pir Mazhar was
released on September 14, again, he was not released.81 His wife filed a
constitutional petition to the High Court of Sindh, alleging that her
husband’s detention at the hands of the care-taker government was illegal,
and solely an effort to deny him the freedom to campaign in the provincial
elections.82 The Sindh High Court on October 2, 1990, declared that he
should be released immediately.83 The State refused to release him.
Though the public outside the jail cell were successful in demanding his
release for a short time following a protest, he was re-arrested for the
fourth time on October 23, 1990. He was again released on October 27 for
lack of evidence.84

75

Id at 10.
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Amnesty International Special Report, supra note 7, at 11.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
76
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In June 1991, ten more charges were registered against Pir Mazhar
and other MNAs.85 Five of the cases were dropped for lack of evidence.86
Of the five remaining cases, the other accused citizens declared in sworn
statements that they did not make any statements to implicate Pir Mazhar
and the other MNA.87 Instead, they were forced to sign blank papers under
torture, coercion and duress, which were later shown by the State to be the
statements implicating Pir Mazhar.88 Pir Mazhar was compelled to move
out of Sindh, since the warrants for the five pending cases continue to be
out for his arrest.89
In January 1992, there was a crackdown on the leaders of the Jeay
Sindh Mahaz (Long Live Sindh Front). Its leader, GM Syed, was placed
under house arrest on January 18, for making a speech demanding a
separate Sindhi homeland, though he had made such demands several
times in the past.90 He was charged with a conspiracy to wage war against
Pakistan, for condemnation of the creation of the state of Pakistan and for
promoting enmity between different groups.91 In February of 1992, a
Special Court for the Suppression of Terrorist Activities gave out arrest
warrants for other Jeay Sindh Mahaz activists.92
Throughout his life, G.M. Syed asserted that the Sindhi people
hold an inalienable right to self-determination, and was known as a
“visionary of the modern Sindhi nation.”93 He was committed to the idea
that the independence of Sindh would help bring a lasting solution for
85

Id at 12.
Amnesty International Special Report, supra note 7, at 12.
87
Id.
88
Id.
89
Id.
90
Id at 18-19.
91
Id.
92
Amnesty International Special Report, supra note 7, at 19.
86
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peace in Pakistan and the surrounding region.94 Though he was committed
to peace, religious tolerance and non-violence, G.M Syed was repeatedly
subjected to political detention without trials for over three decades.95
Both Amnesty International and Human Rights International declared him
a “Prisoner of Conscious.”96 He died in custody in 1995.97
More recently, under the military rule of General Musharraf, who
took power in a bloodless coup in October of 1999, there continues to be
suppression of peaceful political opposition. General Musharraf declared a
Proclamation of Emergency as he seized power, allegedly to restore
democracy to Pakistan.98 However, the proclamation remains in effect as
of 2004, leaving open the possibility of limitless extensions of military
rule. According to Pakistan’s Lawyer’s Committee for Human Rights (a
non-governmental

organization),

as

of

March

2004

there

are

approximately 170 political prisoners in Pakistani jails, most who have
been held for months or years without proper trials.99 This includes the
seven-year detention and documented torture of Benazir Bhutto’s
husband, Asif Ali Zadari.100 Amnesty International reports that in the year
2000, the military government of Pakistan sentenced 258 people to

93

Sindhi Link, Remembering G.M Syed (March, 1993) available at
http://www.sindhilink.net/wsc/2003/g-m-syed-proceedings-2003 (last visited May 20,
2004).
94
Id.
95
Id.
96
Id. See also, Human Rights International’s Press Release (1995), Violations of Human
Rights in Sindh, including Death in Custody of Sain GM Syed, available at
http://sindhlink.net/saeen/articles/articles_eulogy_wsc.htm. (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
97
Id.
98
Human Rights Watch World Report 2001, Pakistan (2001), Pakistan, Human Rights
Developments, available at http://www.hrw.org/wr2k1/asia/pakistan.html
99
South Asian Tribune, 170 Political Prisoners, (March, 2004), available at
www.satribune.com/archives/feb29_mar6_04/PI_asif.htm.
100
Id. The Economist, Benazir Bhutto’s Husband Freed (November 25, 2004), available
at http://www.economist.com/displayStory.cfm?story_id=3436303. In November 2004,
Asif Zardari was released from jail on a bail order after 8 years of imprisonment, as he
had never been convicted of any of the 16 charges of corruption and murder against him.
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death.101 Most of these prisoners were sentenced to death by the Special
Courts, where many were presumed guilty of the charges against them.102
Furthermore, human rights and women’s rights organizations throughout
the country have been harassed through threats and intimidation.103
4. New Anti-Terrorism Laws Affecting Political Opposition
Members
In August 2000, under a promise to build a guided democracy,
President Musharraf unilaterally amended the Pakistani Constitution.104
Amendments to the Constitution gave President Musharraf the right to
dissolve parliament and to extend his term in office. On January 26, 2001,
President Musharraf also issued an order requiring all Supreme and High
Court judges to uphold the Provisional Constitution Order (PCO), which
prohibits the Supreme Court and High Courts from making any decisions
against the Chief Executive.105 Holding the Legislature and Judiciary
directly answerable to the military government has severely decreased
political accountability in the country.
In what the president has called an effort to hold officials
responsible for corruption, the creation of the National Accountability
Bureau (NAB) has been used as a vehicle to suppress political opposition
and detain former party leaders.106 Those convicted under the National
Accountability Ordinance (NAO) are barred from political office for 21
years.107 Under the NAO, the burden of proof for corruption charges is

101

Amnesty International, Report on Pakistan 2000, available at
http://web.amnesty.org/web/ar2000web.nsf
102
Id.
103
Id.
104
Macon News, Musharraf Grants Self Broad Powers (Aug 21, 2002), available at
http://www.macon.com/mld/macon/3907516 (last visited May 20, 2004).
105
Human Rights Watch World Report, supra note 98.
106
Id.
107
Id.
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placed on the defense.108 Political opposition has also been curbed through
placing criminal charges against protest and rally organizers against the
Maintenance of Public Order (MPO) Ordinance.109 This sedition law
criminalizes speech that brings “hatred, or contempt, or excites or attempts
to excite disaffection towards the Central or Provincial Government.”110
Broad language in the ordinance also bans various forms of speech that “is
likely to cause fear or alarm to the public” or is likely to “further any
activity prejudicial to public safely or the maintenance of public order.”111
Human Rights Watch has noted that the ethnically based Sindhi parties,
Jeay Sindh Quami Mahaz (JSQM) and MQM, have been particularly
targeted.112
In November of 2002, President Musharraf also tightened
Pakistan’s anti-terrorism laws, a move that was criticized by various
human rights groups. The amendments in the Anti-Terrorism Act allow
for the police to detain suspects for up to one year without bringing any
charges.113 The previous term of detention was for a month. The
amendments also allow Pakistani police to investigate the financial assets
of relatives of any suspects, without showing reasonable suspicion for the
search.114
The Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP) believes that
these new amendments, which also enable police to arrest anyone
suspected of having ties to groups that commit sectarian violence whether
or not the group has been banned, are draconian.115 Opposition parties,
108
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such as Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), and human rights
groups are calling this the “black law.”116 The PPP fears that such laws
will enable the government to detain people who voice political
opposition.117 The laws would allow Pakistani police and security to arrest
people without any evidence against them, except for the faintest
suspicion.118
Advocates of the anti-terrorism amendments allege that such laws
were necessary, because under the previous laws, the police were unable
to arrest forces that are hiding within Pakistan, but have committed no
violence within Pakistan itself, such as Al-Qaeda. 119
Amnesty International recalls hundreds of people that have been
arrested in Pakistan, detained or given over to US custody, by
circumventing the existing legal safeguards.120 The current amendments
are seen as unnecessary and arbitrary, given the fact that officials are
circumventing the strict anti-terrorism laws that are already in place.
121

According to Amnesty International, “detaining anyone for up to a year

on the mere suspicion that they may be associated with an organization
which may not even be classified as an illegal group violates a whole
range of internationally agreed human rights.” 122 Legalizing searches and
detentions to take place without reasonable suspicion, can open the doors
to unhindered police activity, violating Article 9 of the Universal
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Declaration of Human Rights, which calls for no one to be subject to
arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.123
5. Political Arrests in Sindh are Violating Pakistan’s
International Legal Obligations
Arbitrary arrest and detention without reference to any law at all
violates International human rights standards.

Detention by repeated

arrests and arbitrarily planting charges on persons is considered a form of
“arbitrary detention,” violating Article 9(1) of the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). Article 9(1) states, “Everybody has
the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be subjected to
arbitrary arrest or detention.”124 Arbitrary detention also violates Article 9
of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states, “No one shall
be subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention or exile.”125
Political prisoners in Sindh are usually tried by courts set up under
the Suppression of Terrorist Activities (Special Courts) Act of 1975.126
This act allows the federal government and provincial government, at its
direction, to set up special courts to try offenses found within the Act.127
These offenses include non-violent political acts, such as sedition and
attempting to wage war against Pakistan (which was the charge placed
against G.M Syed after he demanded a separate Sindhi home-land).128
This legislation includes provisions under Section 8, which deny the
accused the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty.129 The
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accused can also be convicted on circumstantial evidence.130 The Special
Courts Act clearly violates Article 14(2) of the ICCPR, which states that,
“Everyone charged with a criminal offense shall have the right to be
presumed innocent until proven guilty according to the law.”131 This
presumption of innocence is considered essential to protecting human
rights.
Having a set of special courts whose procedures significantly differ
from the regular courts “violates the right to be tried by the established
legal procedures of one’s country.”132

Article 2 of the UN Basic

Principles of the Independence of the Judiciary states that, “tribunals that
do not use the duly established procedures of the legal process shall not be
created to displace the jurisdiction belonging to the ordinary courts or
judicial tribunals.”133
Furthermore, the fact that the trials of the Jeay Sindh Mahaz
activists, under the Special Courts, were not open to the press or the public
also violates a fundamental ICCPR principle stated in Article 14(1), that
everyone shall be entitled to fair and public hearings, unless there are
exceptional and well-defined circumstances for excluding the public.134
The documented torture, rape and killing of many political
prisoners in detention violates Article 5 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, which states, “No one shall be subjected to cruel, inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment.”135 Human rights organizations
urge Pakistan to ratify the UN Convention against Torture and Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, and the ICCPR.136
130
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The Kalabagh Dam Project: The Most Recent Example of
the Discrimination Against the Sindhi People
1. Background
Pakistan is currently facing a huge water shortage due to a long

cycle of drought and the reduced storage capacity of its existing two
reservoirs. President Musharraf is urging the building the Kalabagh Dam
and reservoir and the Thal Canal to dam the Indus River and create more
irrigation water.

The Kalabagh Dam will cost $42 billion and will

generate 3,600 megawatts of electricity.137 President Musharraf urges that
the dam is necessary to save 17 million-acre feet of water (MAF) a year
from being wasted as this water currently flows to the sea.138

The

Government argues that the Kalabagh reservoir would increase irrigation
water supply reliability and compensate for the loss of water storage at the
other dams, which is occurring due to silting. 139
The Kalabagh Dam project was initially shelved due to huge
opposition. However, President Musharraf announced his intention to restart the project in September of 2003. Sindhi political activists have been
strongly protesting against the building of the Kalabagh Dam, and view its
building as a matter of life and death.140
The government is concerned that with the rapidly growing
population the demand for food and water will also increase. Pakistan’s
increasing food import bill is being blamed on the rising population and
137

Ahmad Naeem Khan Pakistan’s Mega Dam Plan Hits Opposition Barrage (March
2003), South Asia Monitor, available at
http://southasia.oneworld.net/article/view/67237/1/.
138
Id.
139
Kaleem Omar, Some Critics Say Big Dams Do More Harm Than Good (Sep. 2003),
JANG NEWS, available at http://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/sep2003-weekly/busrev-0809-2003 (last visited Mar. 20, 2005).
140
Susanne Wong, Urgent Action Alert (August, 2000), INTERNATIONAL RIVERS
NETWORK (quoting Kalabagh Dam protest leader, Rasool Palijo), available at
http://www.irn.org/programs/india/index.asp?id=/programs/india/action000808.html.

Vol. 3 [2005]
120

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS FOR THE PEOPLE OF SINDH
Kavita Tekchandani

the reduced availability of water.141 The provinces of Sindh and Punjab
have been struggling for water rights, which has turned into a serious
confrontation between the provinces regarding the distribution of the
water of the Indus River.142 Though the Kalabagh Dam would generally
create more irrigation water for the country, its most beneficial affects will
be felt in the Punjab province, while the human and environmental costs
will be mainly felt in Sindh.
In 2003, President Musharraf, while strongly urging the building
of the Kalabagh Dam, also re-constituted the Indus River System
Authority (IRSA) to resolve the dispute over the sharing of irrigation
water.143 IRSA however, has not been able to work out an acceptable
solution for the parties.144
2. Why Sindh Opposes the Kalabagh Dam
There are various reasons why Sindh opposes the building of the
Kalabagh Dam. The Kalabagh Dam will displace an estimated 124,000250,000 people living mainly in Sindh, Baluchistan and the NWFP
provinces.145 It will submerge at least 35,000 acres of land, including
endangered mangrove forests.146 Several species of endangered fish, the
famous Indus dolphin and sea cat would become extinct with the building
of the dam and further shrink of the Indus Delta.147 Furthermore, ancient
cities along the Indus, including Mardan, Charsadda and Nowshehra
would sink.148 The resulting reduction of fresh water, following years of
141
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drought in Sindh would be a disaster for Sindhi agriculture and
fisheries.149
The PPP, MQM and various Sindhi nationalist parties feel the dam
is designed to benefit Punjab, which is the most politically dominant and
largest province, at the expense of Sindh, Baluchistan and the North West
Frontier Province (NWFP). 150 Party leaders view the dam as an anti-Sindh
plan. Nation wide anti-dam demonstrations and boycotts were staged in
late 2003-2004, to appeal to the international donors against funding the
dam.151 The Awami National Party general provincial secretary of NWFP
expressed sentiments felt by the Sindhis when he said, “We are loyal to
Pakistan. We want to live here, but [this project has] put us to the test.”152
Sindh is not the only province opposed to the dam; notably, the Kalabagh
Dam was rejected unanimously by the elected provincial parliaments of
three of the four affected provinces in Pakistan.153
Sindhi political activists and environmental activists argue that in
reality the Kalabagh Dam will be ineffective in meeting the Government’s
expectations. The dam will trap the sediments of the Indus, which has the
fifth highest sediment load in the world, thereby increasing the salinity of
the irrigation water available to Sindh.154 This would further degrade the
agricultural productivity of the Indus basin and destroy the surrounding
forests and fisheries.155 Ironically, the increased salinity is theorized to be
the cause of the downfall of the early Indus Valley Civilization of Sindh
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(of Mohenjo-Daro) 3,500 years ago.156

In addition, Sindh irrigation

expert, Senator Kazi has emphasized to the government that there is not
enough water in the Indus River flow to fill the dam. Because of low water
flow in the Indus, any upstream reservoirs such as the Kalabagh will be
unfilled an average of 5 out of every 6 years.157
The dam also represents a repetition of water violations, by what is
seen as a “Punjab dominated” government. Punjab has been accused of
illegally diverting water from the Tarbela Dam, which is also located on
the Indus, by illegally keeping open link canals, in violation of past
agreements.158
Furthermore, it should be noted that the concession signed by
Sindh, under the 1991 Water Accord, allowing water distribution to
Punjab, was signed by the unelected care-taker government of Sindh,
which was installed during the time when PM Nawaz Sharif
simultaneously dissolved the PPP National Government and provincial
assemblies.159 The care-taker government consisted of un-elected state
leaders, installed by the central government.160
For the Sindhis, the underlying fear is that the Kalabagh Dam may
be used as a political instrument by the national government to further
suppress Sindhi political freedoms, since the obvious consequences of
damming the Indus, would leave Sindh economically weak and dependant
on Punjab for food.161
In December of 2003, eleven US Congressmen from the House of
Representatives wrote a letter to President Musharraf, urging that the
156
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projects of the Kalabagh Dam and Thal Canal on the Indus River be
halted.162 They stated, “The projects threaten the environmental security
and the cultural and economic stability of the Sindh province. Already
suffering from poverty and extreme drought, the Sindhi community would
be greatly challenged if the river constructions continue.”163 They
expressed their concern that the Pakistani government was ignoring the
Sindhi’s opposition to the river constructions, which was made clear
through the unanimous provincial government’s decision against the
project and through the daily street protests occurring in Sindh.164
A majority of the populations living in the detrimentally affected
provinces of Sindh and Baluchistan are already living under poverty
levels. This is twice as high as the poverty rates in the other provinces.165
The building of the dam, along with the government’s refusal to alleviate
their conditions will lead to an economic imbalance within the country,
threatening the unity and integrity of the nation.166
3. Available Alternatives
In May of 2003, Pakistan made a request for funding future
reservoirs including the Kalabagh Dam to international donor agencies
and governments.167 The World Bank, the International Monetary Fund,
the Islamic Development Bank, the United Arab Emirates, Sweden and
Japan all refused the request.168 First, the agencies stated there are
alternatives available to Pakistan, as the country could, through proper
162
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lining of its existing watercourses and canals, save 32 million acre feet
(MAF) water, which is now being wasted in the saline zone because of the
improper lining.169 Second, the Pakistani government could introduce a
Water Pricing Mechanism (WPM) to encourage people to ration water.170
And finally, donors stressed the importance of Pakistan developing a
national water policy and consensus on controversial projects like the
Kalabagh Dam; otherwise, its government would lack the political support
and power necessary to initiate the project.171
In November of 2000, the World Commission on Dams (WCD), an
independent and international organization, published a report stating, that
though large dams have provided many benefits, it was often at too high of
a price because the people affected have little say in their planning and
building. It is usually the most marginalized people who are affected by
the dam. In this case, it is the indigenous Sindhis who would feel the most
adverse affects of the dam.

The WCD stated that there are many

alternative means to meet the people’s energy needs including renewable
energy, recycling, better irrigation and reduction of water losses.
If building more dams is considered necessary, another alternative
is for the government to build dams which would be as effective, but
which would carry a smaller human cost. One proposal is the building of
the Basha Dam that would produce 80% of Kalabagh’s power production
and would also significantly reduce the silt volume that is flowing into the
water reservoirs.172

However the government has not prepared the

feasibility of other dam sites and sadly the people do not know of their
options when it comes to choosing a site for building a dam.173
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4. Strong Opposition to the Dam Demonstrated Throughout
Sindh and Other Affected Provinces
Since the dam project was first announced, there have been almost
daily protests in Sindh and other provinces against the dam. For example,
in 2000, strikes were held by the Sindh Peoples Students Federation
(SPSF), resulting in the closing down of major cities in Sindh.

174

The

Awami National Party (ANP) and the Sindhi Shaheed Bhutto Peoples
Party, Sindh Students Federation, JSQM and MQM have joined the AntiKalabagh Dam Action Committee to protest the project.175 The project
has been described as one that is affecting the overall welfare of Sindh
rather than an ethnic issue.176 The protestors have made clear, “You
construct the Kalabagh dam, and we will build a Sindhu Desh
(Nation).”177
More recently there have been hundreds of arrests of the peaceful
protestors when the JSQM started peaceful sit-ins in March, 2004 against
the Pakistani centralized decision to construct the dam.178 However, this
action failed to deter protestors and the JSQM has continued to organize
large protests and sit-ins across Sindh. The World Sindhi Congress (a
non-governmental human rights advocacy organization) has condemned
the political harassment of the Sindhi people.179 Following what seems to
have become standard practice, many protestors have been detained and
held in unknown places. Furthermore, they have been unable to meet with
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family or defense counsel.180 Refusal to recognize the strong opposition to
the dam is interpreted as a sign of the National Government’s
discrimination against the Sindhi people and its lack of political
accountability to the people.
VII. Political Discrimination Against Sindhis, an Ethnic and
Linguistic Minority Violates Pakistan’s International Legal
Obligations
In present international law, discrimination is defined as “unfair,
unreasonable, unjustifiable or arbitrary distinction applicable to any act or
conduct which denies to individuals equality of treatment with other
individuals because they belong to particular groups in society.”181 This
principle protects individuals from group-based discrimination. There are
three basic groups recognized in international law: (1) ethnic and racial
groups, (2) religious groups and (3) linguistic and cultural groups.182 As
discussed earlier, Sindhis constitute a separate ethnic and linguistic group
that distinguishes them from the Pakistani majority. These groups have the
recognized right to existence and non-discrimination, under various
international instruments.183
In 1965, the UN General Assembly adopted the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, which was signed by
Pakistan. Under the Convention ‘racial discrimination’ is described
broadly as:
Any distinction, exclusion, restriction, or preference based
on race, color, descent or national or ethnic origin which
has the purpose or effect of …impairing... exercise on an
equal footing of human rights and fundamental freedoms in
180
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the political, economic, social, cultural or any other field of
public life.184
Article 2 lists the obligations of the States. States cannot practice
racial discrimination against persons, groups or institutions, nor sponsor
racial discrimination by any persons or groups.185 Government policies at
the local and national level have to be reviewed to comply with the
convention.186 Article 5 deals with the judicial, political and civil rights
that should be guaranteed to the people.187
In the case of Sindh, it is clear that the Islamabad Government has
failed to follow its obligations under the Convention. First, as discussed
earlier, the national government’s policy of political intimidation, mass
arrests, and imprisonment of all political opponents and those specifically
calling for more cultural autonomy violates Pakistan’s obligations under
Art. 5(d).

Under Article 5(d), explicitly mentioned, are the rights to

freedom of thought and conscience, freedom of opinion and expression,
and the right to freedom of peaceful assembly and association.188 Political
rights are guaranteed under Article 5(c); individuals have the right to vote
and stand for election.189

They have the right to take part in the

government as well as the conducting of public affairs at all levels of
government, and equal access to public services.190 Furthermore, placing
the victims in continuous detention under inhumane conditions, through
orders by the Pakistani Special Courts, violates Article 5(a), which states
184
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that all individuals have the right to equal treatment under Court Tribunals
and the Right to be secure by the State against violence.191
The government’s insistence to build the Thal Canal and Kalabagh
Dam, despite the rejection of the proposal by three of the four provincial
governments and its likely detrimental effects on the Sindhi people, is a
sign of ethnic discrimination. The national government’s insistence on the
dam project violates Article 2 of the Convention as it has the purpose and
effect of denying the Sindhi people equal footing of fundamental freedoms
in their political, economic, social and cultural fields of life, since the dam
will have devastating effects on both the economy and environment of the
province.
Pakistan also signed the 1989 International Labor Organization
(ILO) Convention, which calls for the protection of indigenous
populations. Under the Convention, “Indigenous peoples” are defined as
those “on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited
the country… at the establishment of present state boundaries, and who,
irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social,
economic, cultural and political institutions.192 Sindhis are clearly
regarded as such a people, as they have a long history of autonomy in
following their own social, economic and cultural traditions.
The ILO passed the 1957 Indigenous and Tribal Populations
Convention (No. 107), which was revised in 1989. The Preamble of the
Convention is aimed at protection of indigenous populations, improving
their living and working conditions and achieving a progressive
integration into their national communities.193

However, it should be

noted that under Article 2(c), measures tending towards the artificial
191
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assimilation of these populations” from national integration policies is
excluded, as well as those measures using force or coercion as a means of
promoting integration.194
Article 11 recognizes the right of indigenous members to
ownership, collective or individual, of the land.195 Article 12, provides that
indigenous populations cannot be removed from their habitual territories
without their free consent, but exceptions are given for when removal is in
accordance with the national law for reasons relating to national security
or national economic development.196
The Pakistani Government’s post-partition policy of allotting
former Sindhi Hindu properties to political allies and to the new Muhajir
refugees, without addressing the claims of Sindhi Muslims clearly violated
this principle. More recently, the Government’s insistence on the building
of the Kalabagh Dam is a clear violation of Article 11, as the government
fails to recognize the rights of the Indigenous Sindhi population to
ownership of portions of the Indus River, or at least to have their concerns
considered regarding the damming of the river. Given the Indus River’s
historical importance and current reliance by Sindhi agriculturalists and
fishermen, and because damming of the river would also have a severe
detrimental environmental impact on the Sindhi land, especially gives the
Sindhi population basis to make the decision of whether or not the river
should be dammed.
Although the Government may claim that building the dam, and
displacing thousands of Sindhis is necessary for reasons of economic
development under Article 12, there are strong arguments that the project
193

Id at 105. (For its text, ILO International Labor Conventions and Recommendations,
1919-1981, at 901, 909 (1989)).
194
Id.
195
Id at 106.

Vol. 3 [2005]
130

FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS FOR THE PEOPLE OF SINDH
Kavita Tekchandani

is not necessary or even favorable for the nation’s economic development.
Building the dam would bring huge economic downfall for the Sindhi
economy, as cities will be sunk, thousands will be displaced, and many
more will lose their livelihood, detrimentally affecting the national
economy.

Because there are clear energy alternatives available, this

project cannot be said to be “necessary for reasons of economic
development.” Rather, the government should be more accommodating of
Sindh’s concerns regarding decisions that detrimentally affect their land
and environment. To fail to recognize their concerns will only alienate an
already frustrated populace further away from the vision of a unified
Pakistan.
Conclusion
Since the creation of the Pakistani State, there has been a denial of
fundamental freedoms to the Sindhi People.

Sindhis have undergone

staunch political repression under a highly centralized and unyielding
government, including being denied the right to free speech and peaceful
assembly. Despite the fact that they enjoy a majority and indigenous
status in Sindh, the minority Muhajir population has been politically and
economically dominant.

Under a government policy of forced

assimilation, Sindhis have been denied the right to promote their language
and traditions and are now left with the reality that their 5,000 year-old
culture is quickly vanishing. The Kalabagh Dam controversy is just the
most recent phenomenon of the National Government’s policy to
discriminate against the Sindhi people.
The Government justifies its actions on a need to build national
unity, however, these actions have been self-defeating. Pakistan’s policy
of forced cultural assimilation, political repression and lack of political
accountability by the State, has pushed those populations living on the
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brink of poverty and repression, such as the Sindhis, to become
disillusioned with the Pakistani Government. When a state denies even
the most fundamental political rights and human rights, as recognized by
international law, to groups within its population, it cannot but expect
these groups to eventually grow frustrated and demand self-governance.
Pakistan’s only hope at building national unity is to work quickly
to restore its people’s confidence in the central government by accepting
the reality that it is a diverse nation with ethnic and linguistic minorities
existing within its borders. This includes recognizing that these indigenous
populations have a right to fundamental freedoms, respect and dignity.

